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DUE PROCESS
U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall . . . deprive to any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law ....
N.Y. CONST. art. , § 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
COURT OF APPEALS
Chaya S. v. Frederick L.'
(decided June 12, 1997)
This case presents a challenge to the New York Domestic
Relations Law2  governing consent in private placement
adoptions.3 Here, a biological mother sought nullification of the
adoption of her child, based on the Surrogate's failure to follow
statutory procedure; a procedure which was designed to balance
and protect the rights of the biological parents, the adoptive
parents, and the child. While not specifically addressed, the case
alluded to a right to independent counsel issue implicit in the dual
190 N.Y.2d 389, 683 N.E.2d 746, 660 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1997).
2 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b (McKinney 1988).
3 Chaya S., 90 N.Y.2d 389, 683 N.E>2d 746, 660 N.Y.S.2d 840.
4 In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 234, 487 N.E.2d 241, 246, 496 N.Y.S.2d
384, 389 (1985) (recognizing the importance of certainty for adoptive parents,
it was determined that the natural parents should be bound by their irrevocable
consent, despite insufficiency of notice under the statute).
1
et al.: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAWREVIEW
representation of a birth parent and adoptive parents.5
Furthermore, because of the fundamental nature of the interest in
family and child-rearing, due process requires certain procedural
safeguards to protect one's freedom of choice in these areas of
important personal matters.6 Indeed, as this case points out,
"New York's statutory procedure for consent to private
placement adoption raises serious issues of due process and
waiver rights of natural parents." 7
Petitioner, Chaya S., sought revocation of judicially supervised
consent which granted adoption of her child to her parents, and
thus terminated her parental rights.8 Her consent was given at a
hearing before the Surrogate court, with the able assistance of
counsel. 9 The attorney, though originally retained to represent
Chaya in her divorce proceedings, also represented Chaya's
parents, the respondents and adoptive parents in this case. 10
Though successful in negotiating Chaya's divorce, and in
executing the present adoption, the attorney, Mandel, was herself
challenged on the question of whether she represented Chaya or
Chaya's parents in the adoption matter."
New York's Domestic Relations Law section 115-b requires a
judge in an adoption proceeding to inform a biological parent of a
5 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1997). This statute states
in pertinent part: "No attorney or law firm shall serve as the attorney for, or
provide any legal services to both the natural parents and adoptive parents."
Id. Prior to this amendment in 1989, New York law did not preclude one
attorney from representing both the adoptive parents and the birth mother in an
adoption proceeding. Therefore, the dual representation at issue in the present
case was legally permissible at the time of this adoption. Id. Chaya S., 90
N.Y.2d at 397, 683 N.E.2d at 749-50, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property; without due process of law. . . ." Id.
' In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d at 239 n.6, 487 N.E.2d at 249 n.6, 496
N.Y.S.2d at 392 n.6.
8 Chaya S., 90 N.Y.2d at 394, 684 N.E.2d at 748, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
9 Id.
'o Id. at 395, 683 N.E.2d at 748, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
" Id. Mandel testified that "she represented the adoptive parents .... " Id.
[Vol 14932
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 3, Art. 21
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/21
DUE PROCESS
right to counsel of one's own choosing.'2 Here, the Surrogate,
noting Mandel's' presence in court and seemingly adequate
representation, assumed that Mandel was Chaya's chosen
attorney. 3 Under this assumption, the Surrogate did not inform
Chaya of this right.'4 This failure to inform of a statutory right is
the basis of petitioner's argument for revocation of her consent,
and thus nullification of the adoption.'5
The New York Court of Appeals blocked petitioner's attempt to
revoke the adoption, concluding that the Surrogate's technical
oversight should not defeat an otherwise valid, judicially
supervised consent. 6 Furthermore, the court found that "dual
representation" did not preclude petitioner's rights at the consent
hearing, and the attorney in question appropriately appeared on
behalf of both parties. 7 Accordingly, the court concluded that
petitioner's right to counsel was not abridged, and her petition to
void the adoption should have been denied. 8
The facts of this case begin with a marriage in turmoil. 9
Petitioner, Chaya, was married for less than three months when
she and her husband, Asher A., decided to separate.?0 At this
point, Chaya discovered that she was two months pregnant with
Asher's child.2' Wishing to be discharged from any future
12 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b (2)(b) (McKinney 1988). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
At the time that a parent appears before a judge or surrogate
to execute or acknowledge a consent to adoption, the judge
or surrogate shall inform such parent of the consequences of
such act pursuant to the provisions of this section, including
informing such parent of the right to be represented by legal
counsel of the parent's own choosing ....
Id.
13 Chaya S., 90 N.Y.2d at 397, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
14 Id. at 396, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
15 Id. at 394, 683 N.E.2d at 748, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
'6 Id. at 392, 683 N.E.2d at 747, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
17 Id. at 397, 683 N.E.2d at 750, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
"
8 Id. at 397-98, 683 N.E.2d at 750, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
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financial responsibility for the baby, Asher asked petitioner to
have an abortion." Instead, Chaya opted for her parents to adopt
the child, an arrangement that Asher approved of, so long as he
would be released from future liability.Y Indeed, the adoption,
handled by attorney Mandel, was intrinsic to the couple's divorce
settlement.' The terms of the divorce agreement stated that
Chaya was represented by Mandel, that the couple irrevocably
consented to the adoption of the child by respondents, and in
consenting to the adoption, both Chaya and Asher waived any
future rights or responsibilities for the care and maintenance of
the child." Throughout the representation, Chaya consulted with
attorney Mandel directly, inquisitive about every aspect of the
divorce and adoption arrangements.26
Soon after the baby was born, Mandel filed a petition for
adoption on behalf of respondents. 27 Pursuant to statute, Chaya,
accompanied by Mandel, sought judicial consent to the adoption
before the Surrogate in Queens County.28 The Surrogate asked
Chaya what she would do if the child's father would not consent
to the adoption.29 Referring to Mandel by her side, Chaya
definitively answered: "I would consult with my lawyer and see
what options we have."30 The Surrogate then informed petitioner
that consent would effectively sever her control over any aspect
of the child's future. Chaya maintained that she understood the
gravity of her actions, and consented voluntarily. 2 As a result,
her consent became instantly irrevocable and the adoption was
2Id. at 392-93, 683 N.E.2d at 747, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 841.




27Id. at 394, 683 N.E.2d at 748, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
28 Id. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b (2)(a) (McKinney 1988). This
statute states in pertinent part: "A consent to a private placement adoption
may be executed or acknowledged before any judge or surrogate in this state
having jurisdiction over adoption proceedings." Id.
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finalized. 33  Thereafter, Mandel also successfully concluded
petitioner's divorce.M
Sometime after Chaya had remarried, respondents terminated
visitation rights.31 Seeking to invalidate the consent to adoption,
Chaya brought suit claiming fraud in eliciting her consent and a
denial of representation by independent counsel. The trial court
dismissed petitioner's claim of fraud as unwarranted and advised
petitioner of the consequences of her consent. 37 Furthermore, the
court held that the Surrogate reasonably surmised that petitioner
was already represented by counsel, despite the fact that Mandel
testified that she represented the respondents and that Mandel was
named as the attorney for the adoptive parents on the petition for
adoption.3
However, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the
trial court, finding instead that "petitioner was not represented by
counsel and that Mandel in fact represented the adoptive
parents. 39 This conclusion was based on the Surrogate's failure
to inform petitioner of her right to counsel of her own choosing,
as was required by statute.40 In support of this position, the
Appellate Division mentioned specifically that respondents' paid
the attorney's fee, the attorney's name appeared on the adoption
petition, and the attorney herself swore in the affidavit and
testified that she represented the adoptive parents. 4'
Section 115-b of the New York Domestic Relations Law 2 has
been seen as an attempt to bring certainty and permanence to an
area which, historically, has been "unfair to adoptive parents and
33 d. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b (2)(a) (McKinney 1988). "Such
consent shall state that it is irrevocable upon such execution or
acknowledgement." Id.
I Id. Asher had also appeared before the Surrogate, and had freely and
knowingly given his consent to the adoption. Id.
35 Id.
36 1d.





42 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b (2)(b) (McKinney 1988).
1998 935
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unsettling to adoptions generally. 3 Prior to the enactment of this
statute in 1972, the law recognized the biological parents as
superior in status and allowed them a right to revoke their consent
prior to the final order of adoption."
The public became dissatisfied with this parental preference
rule after unpopular court decisions that required children to be
taken out of the adoptive home and returned to the birth parents.45
The New York legislature responded to public sympathies by
reforming the adoption statutes to provide "humane regard for
the rights of the child, the natural parents and the adoptive
parents. 46 In reality, the new statutes gave the adoptive parents
a status equal to that of the natural parents, who had previously
been given preference by the parental presumption.47 What
resulted was a statutory scheme that provided a procedural
framework for consent to adoption in both judicial and
extrajudicial contexts.48 In both contexts, consent must be
knowing and voluntary and the biological parents must be
apprised of the consequences of their irrevocable consent. 49
The impact of the 1972 enactment can be seen in the case of In
re Sarah K.50  Here, the parents of a Down Syndrome infant
decided shortly after the birth of the baby that they were
41 In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 233, 487 N.E.2d 241, 246, 496 N.Y.S.2d
384, 389 (1985).
44Id.
" See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787,
321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971) (allowing birth mother to revoke surrender of her
child based solely on the mother's fitness without consideration of adoptive
parents' legal interests).
46 Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b at
499 (McKinney 1988).
41 Id. "[T]he statute affords substantial procedural rights and protections to
adoptive parents and, where revocation is contested, places adoptive parents on
an equal footing, as proposed custodians for the child, with the natural
parents." Id. "In short, the statute takes away from the natural parents the
benefits of the presumptions afforded them by common law. . . ." Id.
48 Id. at 500.
49 Chaya S v. Frederick L., 90 N.Y.2d 389, 396, 683 N.E.2d 746, 749, 660
N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (1997).
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emotionally unequipped to handle a disabled child.' In arranging
for an extrajudicial consent for adoption pursuant to section 115-b
of the Domestic Relations Law, the natural parents "were single-
minded in their resolve that Sarah be adopted immediately, and
they sought out - and found - the quickest way to accomplish their
objective, for the perceived good of the child as well as their
family."' 2 On these facts, the Court of Appeals determined that
consent was not given under compulsion or threat.53 However,
the birth parents were given insufficient notice of the
commencement of the adoption proceeding, and the consent
forms were ambiguous as to the consequences of untimely
revocation.m This prompted two Appellate Division justices to
recognize the threat to one's right of revocation, and admonished
such practice as "badly flawed." 5  Despite these defects, the
Court of Appeals held that "[a] parent's consent to the release of
a child for adoption has consequence in law, and cannot
invariably be undone at will."56
The New York Court of Appeals asked the legislature to
reexamine section 115-b of the Domestic Relations Law in light
of the practical difficulties evident in In re Sarah K.57 The
legislature responded in 1986 with a bill which amended the law
in relation to consents in private placement adoptions. The 1986
Amendment employed several procedural safeguards to make
certain a natural parent's full understanding of the "permanent
and profound nature of their consent to adoption." 5"
Accordingly, to ensure that the biological parents consent
voluntarily and knowingly, the judiciary must inform the
51 Id. at 228, 487 N.E.2d at 242, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
5 Id. at 241, 487 N.E.2d at 250, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
I d. at 242, 487 N.E.2d at 251, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
SId.
55 Id. at 237, 487 N.E.2d at 248, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
56 Id. at 233, 487 N.E.2d at 245, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
57 Id. at 242, 487 N.E.2d at 251, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
58 Act of Aug. 2, 1986, ch. 817, 1986 N.Y. Laws 1923 (1987) (an act
relating to consent in private placement adoptions).
19 Chaya S. v. Frederick L., 90 N.Y.2d 389, 396, 683 N.E.2d 746, 749, 660
N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (1997).
1998 937
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biological parents: (1) of a right to counsel of one's own
choosing; (2) of the availability of supportive counseling; and, (3)
of the right to be assigned counsel, if indigent and subjected to a
custody or revocation dispute.60 Once consent is so given, it
becomes automatically irrevocable, absent circumstances of
fraud, duress, or coercion in its execution.6'
In the present case, all parties conceded that the Surrogate
failed to inform petitioner of her right to independent counsel.62
The trial court determined that such omission did not in fact
deprive Chaya of representation, as it was obvious that she was
with counsel and was being advised by counsel.63 However, the
Appellate Division reversed this decision, finding that the dual
representation deprived Chaya of her right to counsel of her own
choosing." In response to this order of modification, the Court
of Appeals reviewed the evidence and concluded that the
representation in the adoption proceedings was intrinsic to the
representation for the matrimonial proceedings.6 The court
further found that Chaya made an independent choice to be
represented in this matter by this lawyer.6 As the court pointed
out, this conclusion "more nearly comports with the weight of the
evidence. "67
The court found that Mandel worked very closely with
petitioner in both the matrimonial and adoption proceedings, with
the ultimate goal of obtaining a "Get," a divorce recognized
60 id.
61 Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b at
501 (McKinney 1988).
62 Chaya S., 90 N.Y.2d at 396, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
63 Id. at 397, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
64 Id. at 396, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
65 Id. at 395, 683 N.E.2d at 748, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 396, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843. See Loughry v.
Lincoln First Bank, 67 N.Y.2d 369, 380, 494 N.E.2d 70, 76, 502 N.Y.S.2d
965, 971 (1986) (concluding that a court may review questions of fact when
confronted with an appellate court's order of modification to determine which
of the findings more nearly comports with the weight of the evidence).
[Vol 14
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under Jewish religious law.6 Although Mandel admittedly
represented the adoptive parents and was named as their attorney
on the adoption petition, the facts show that Mandel consulted
directly with Chaya, and appeared with her at the consent
hearing.' Furthermore, when asked by the Surrogate what her
reaction would be if the father tried to block the adoption at this
stage, she answered in reference to Mandel, "I would consult
with my lawyer and see what options we have."3 The court
weighed this statement significantly, deeming this to indicate
"that she already had counsel at the adoption proceeding." 7'
The Court of Appeals also recognized the prudence of the 1989
Amendment of the Social Services Lawn that has since precluded
"dual representation" in these circumstances. The Amendment
clearly prohibits representation of both natural and adoptive
parents by the same attorney?3 Indeed, "[n]ot only should the
birth parent be represented by her own attorney, it is
recommended that the attorney for the adoptive parent should not
recommend an attorney to represent the birth parent." 7- The
court recognized the potential conflict of interest that the
Amendment was designed to prevent; nevertheless, the court did
not see fit "that every adoption finalized in the era of dual
representation... be voided." 75 The case was remitted to the
Appellate Division with instructions to defer to the determination
that the Surrogate's failure to inform of a right to independent
counsel did not, in fact, deprive petitioner of an attorney of her
own choosing.76
61 Chaya S., 90 N.Y.2d at 396-97, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
Attorney Mandel properly advised her of the consequences of the adoption
consent, and secured for Chaya a final divorce and a Get. Id.69 Id. at 397, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 374(6) (McKinney 1997).
73 Chaya S., 90 N.Y.2d at 396, 683 N.E.2d at 749, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
' Carrieri, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374[6] at 107
(McKinney Supp. 1997).
75 Chaya S., 90 N.Y.2d at 397, 683 N.E.2d at 750, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 844.761d. at 397-98, 683 N.E.2d at 750, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
1998 939
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Judge Titone concurred in the result but analyzed the facts quite
differently.v The judge concluded that dual representation in this
case, though then permissible, resulted in a lack of representation
for petitioner.78  The concurring opinion explained that
petitioner's parents were not disinterested parties in this
resolution and in fact paid for Mandel's representation entirely. 9
Furthermore, while all correspondence regarding the divorce
proceedings were sent to petitioner directly, all adoption
correspondence went solely to respondents, indicating that the
adoption proceeding was not necessarily connected to the
matrimonial proceeding. 0
Judge Titone considered petitioner's remarks regarding
consultation with her attorney "a weak predicate, since it was a
hypothetical remark made in response to a hypothetical
question." 8' The judge found instead Mandel's own remarks
more compelling in that they revealed that she did not consider
herself to be petitioner's attorney.A2 Judge Titone found this fact
alone to be dispositive of Chaya's lack of representation. 3
However, in considering the Surrogate's omission in his
allocution, one "need not conclude that a failure to follow the
statutory mandate should always invalidate the adoption
proceeding itself."84 Judge Titone analyzed this case according to
the totality of the circumstances. He balanced the rights of all
involved, and sought to secure certainty and finality in the
adoption, as was intended by the statute." Where consent is
shown to be knowing and voluntary, "no useful judicial or social
77 Id. at 398, 683 N.E.2d at 750, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (Titone, J.
concurring).
78 Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
7 91Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
o Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 399, 683 N.E.2d at 750, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
8 Id. at 399, 683 N.E.2d at 751, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 845 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
83 Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 400, 683 N.E.2d at 751, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 845 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
85 Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
940 [Vol 14
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purpose would be served by undoing the adoption order and
disrupting the child's new family ties because of a technical flaw
in the surrender allocution. "9
There are constitutional issues implicit in this case involving the
fundamental liberty interest of the parent-child relationship. The
termination of parental rights is an extreme threat to one's liberty
representing the most significant of state intrusions."' Indeed,
"[a]ny procedure that affects those parental rights must guarantee
due process."m This case never reaches the stage of challenging
the constitutionality of New York's adoption statutes. Rather, it
illustrates the procedures that the law in New York has employed
to assure the protections of due process in the adoption arena.
Daxor Corporation v.
New York State Department of HealthO
(decided June 5, 1997)
Appellant, New York State Department of Health [hereinafter
"State"], terminated the respondent, Daxor Corporation's
[hereinafter "Daxor"], provisional licenses to operate certain
medical facilities. 0  Daxor commenced the instant action,
asserting that the termination was "biased, arbitrary and
capricious, " 91 and that due process, guaranteed by both the
Federal9 and New York State93 Constitutions, had been violated
6 Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
8 See In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 239 n.6, 487 N.E.2d 241, 249 n.6,
496 N.Y.S.2d 384, 392 n.6 (1985).
8 id.
89 90 N.Y.2d 89, 681 N.E.2d 356, 659 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1997).
90 Id. at 95, 681 N.E.2d at 359, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
91 Id.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 This section provides in pertinent part:
"No State shall ... deprive to any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." Id.
9 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
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